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Abstract
Many applications of machine learning, such as human health research,
involve processing private or sensitive information. Privacy concerns may
impose significant hurdles to collaboration in scenarios where there are
multiple sites holding data and the goal is to estimate properties jointly
across all datasets. Differentially private decentralized algorithms can
provide strong privacy guarantees. However, the accuracy of the joint
estimates may be poor when the datasets at each site are small. This pa-
per proposes a new framework, Correlation Assisted Private Estimation
(CAPE), for designing privacy-preserving decentralized algorithms with
better accuracy guarantees in an honest-but-curious model. CAPE can
be used in conjunction with the functional mechanism for statistical and
machine learning optimization problems. A tighter characterization of the
functional mechanism is provided that allows CAPE to achieve the same
performance as a centralized algorithm in the decentralized setting using
all datasets. Empirical results on regression and neural network problems
for both synthetic and real datasets show that differentially private meth-
ods can be competitive with non-private algorithms in many scenarios of
interest.
1 Introduction
Privacy-sensitive learning is important in many applications: examples include
human health research, business informatics, and location-based services among
others. Releasing any function of private data, even summary statistics and
other aggregates, can reveal information about the underlying training data.
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Differential privacy (DP) [1] is a cryptographically motivated and mathemat-
ically rigorous framework for measuring the risk associated with performing
computations on private data. More specifically, it measures the privacy risk in
terms of the probability of identifying the presence of individual data points in a
dataset from the results of computations performed on that data. As such, it has
emerged as a de-facto standard for privacy-preserving technologies in research
and practice [2–4].
Differential privacy is also useful when the private data is distributed over
different locations (sites). For example, a consortium for medical research on a
particular disease may consist of several healthcare centers/research labs, each
with their own dataset of human subjects [5,6]. Data holders may be reluctant
or unable to directly share “raw” data to an aggregator due to ethical (privacy)
and technical (bandwidth) reasons. From a statistical standpoint, the num-
ber of samples held locally is usually not large enough for meaningful feature
learning. Consider training a deep neural network to detect Alzheimer’s disease
based on neuroimaging data from several studies [6]: training locally at one site
is infeasible as the number of subjects in each study is small. Decentralized
algorithms can allow data owners to maintain local control of the data while
passing messages to assist in a joint computation across many datasets. If these
computations are differentially private, they can measure and control privacy
risks.
Differentially private algorithms introduce noise to guarantee privacy: con-
ventional distributed DP algorithms often have poor utility due to excess noise
compared to centralized analyses. In this paper we propose a Correlation As-
sisted Private Estimation (CAPE) framework, which is a novel distributed and
privacy-preserving protocol that provides utility close to centralized case. We
achieve this by inducing (anti) correlated noise in the differentially private mes-
sages. The CAPE protocol can be applied to computing loss functions that are
separable across sites. This class includes optimization algorithms, such as em-
pirical risk minimization (ERM) problems, common in machine learning (ML)
applications.
Related Works. There is a vast literature [7–15] on solving optimization
problems in distributed settings, both with and without privacy concerns. In
the machine learning context, the most relevant ones to our current work are
those using ERM and stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [16–24]. Addition-
ally, several works studied distributed differentially private learning for locally
trained classifiers [25–27]. One of the most common approaches for ensuring
differential privacy in optimization problems is to employ randomized gradi-
ent computations [18, 22]. Another common approach is to employ the output
perturbation [17], which adds noise to the output of the optimization prob-
lem according to the sensitivity of the optimization variable. Note that, both of
these approaches involve computing the sensitivity (of the gradient or the output
variable) and then adding noise scaled to the sensitivity [1]. The problem with
output perturbation is that the relation between the data and the parameter
set is often hard to characterize. This is due to the complex nature of the opti-
mization and as a result, the sensitivity is very difficult to compute. However,
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Figure 1: The structure of the network: (a) conventional, (b) CAPE
differentially-private gradient descent methods can circumvent this by bounding
the gradients at the expense of slowing down the convergence process. Finally,
one can employ the objective perturbation [14,17], where we need to perturb the
objective function and find the minimizer of the perturbed objective function.
However, the objective function has to satisfy some strict conditions, which are
not met in many practical optimization problems [28]. In addition to optimiza-
tion problems, Smith [29] proposed a general approach for computing summary
statistics using the sample-and-aggregate framework and both the Laplace and
Exponential mechanisms [30]. Jing [31] proposed a unique approach that uses
perturbed histograms for releasing a class of M -estimators in a non-interactive
way.
Differentially private algorithms provide different guarantees than Secure
Multi-party Computation (SMC) based methods (see [32–37] for thorough
comparisons between SMC and differential privacy based methods). Gade and
Vaidya [38] applied a combination of SMC and DP for distributed optimiza-
tion in which each site adds and subtracts arbitrary functions to confuse the
adversary. Bonawitz et al. [39] proposed a communication-efficient method for
federated learning over a large number of mobile devices. The most recent work
in this line is that of Heikkila¨ et al. [40], who also studied the relationship of
additive noise and sample size in a distributed setting. In their model, S data
holders communicate their data to M computation nodes to compute a function.
Our work is inspired by the seminal work of Dwork et al. [41] that proposed dis-
tributed noise generation for preserving privacy. We employ a similar principle
as Anandan and Clifton [42] to reduce the noise added for differential privacy.
Our application to distributed DP function computation in this paper builds
on the functional mechanism [28], which uses functional approximation [43] and
the Laplace mechanism [1] to create DP approximations for any continuous
and differentiable function. Zhang et al.’s approach [28] does not scale well to
decentralized problems. We provide a better analysis of the sensitivity of their
approximation and adapt the approach to the decentralized setting.
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Our Contribution. The goal of our work is to reduce the amount of noise in
conventional distributed differentially private schemes for applications of ma-
chine learning to settings similar to those found in research consortia. We
summarize our contributions here:
• We propose a novel distributed computation protocol, CAPE, that im-
proves upon the conventional distributed DP schemes and achieves the
same level of utility as the pooled data scenario in certain regimes. CAPE
can be employed in a wide range of computations that frequently appear
in machine learning problems.
• We propose an improved functional mechanism (FM) using a tighter sensi-
tivity analysis. We show analytically that it guarantees less noisy function
computation for linear and logistic regression problems at the expense of
an approximate DP guarantee. Empirical validation on real and synthetic
data validates our approach.
• We extend the FM to decentralized settings and show that CAPE can
achieve the same utility as the pooled data scenario in some regimes.
To the best of our knowledge, this work proposes the first distributed
functional mechanism.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms with varying privacy
and dataset parameters. Our privacy analysis and empirical results on
real and synthetic datasets show that the proposed algorithms can achieve
much better utility than the existing state of the art algorithms.
Note that, we showed a preliminary version of the CAPE protocol in [44]. The
protocol in this paper is more robust against site dropouts and does not require
a trusted third-party.
2 Data and Privacy Model
Notation. We denote vectors with bold lower case letters (e.g., x), matrices
with bold upper case letters (e.g. X), scalars with regular letters (e.g., M)
and indices with lower case letters (e.g., m). Indices typically run from 1 to
their upper-case versions (e.g., m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} , [M ]). We denote the n-th
column of the matrix X as xn. We use ‖ · ‖2, ‖ · ‖F and tr(·) for the Euclidean
(or L2) norm of a vector or spectral norm of a matrix, the Frobenius norm,
and the trace operation, respectively. Finally, we denote the inner-product
between two arrays as 〈·, ·〉. For example, if A and B are two matrices then
〈A,B〉 = tr (A>B).
Distributed Data Setting. We consider a distributed data setting with S sites
and a central aggregator node (see Figure 1). Each site s ∈ [S] holds Ns samples
and the total number of samples across all sites is given by N =
∑S
s=1Ns. We
assume that all parties are “honest but curious”. That is, the sites and the
aggregator will follow the protocol but a subset may collude to learn another
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site’s data/function output. Additionally, we assume that the data samples in
the local sites are disjoint. We use the terms “distributed” and “decentralized”
interchangeably in this paper.
Definition 1 ((, δ)-Differential Privacy [1]). An algorithm A(D) taking values
in a set T provides (, δ)-differential privacy if Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[A(D′) ∈
S] + δ, for all measurable S ⊆ T and all data sets D and D′ differing in a single
entry (neighboring datasets).
This definition essentially states that the probability of the output of an algo-
rithm is not changed significantly if the corresponding database input is changed
by just one entry. Here,  and δ are privacy parameters, where low  and δ ensure
more privacy. The parameter δ can be interpreted as the probability that the
algorithm fails to provide privacy risk . Several mechanisms can be employed
to ensure that an algorithm satisfies differential privacy. Additive noise mecha-
nisms such as the Gaussian or Laplace mechanisms [1,45] and random sampling
using the exponential mechanism [30] are among the most common ones. For
additive noise mechanisms, the standard deviation of the noise is scaled to the
sensitivity of the computation.
Definition 2 (Lp-sensitivity [1]). The Lp-sensitivity of a vector-valued function
f(D) is ∆ := maxD,D′ ‖f(D)−f(D′)‖p, where D and D′ are neighboring datasets.
We will focus on p = 1 and 2 in this paper.
Definition 3 (Gaussian Mechanism [45]). Let f : D 7→ RD be an arbitrary
D-dimensional function with L2-sensitivity ∆. The Gaussian Mechanism with
parameter τ adds noise scaled to N (0, τ2) to each of the D components of the
output and satisfies (, δ) differential privacy if
τ ≥ ∆

√
2 log
1.25
δ
. (1)
Note that, for any given (, δ) pair, we can calculate a noise variance τ2 such
that addition of a noise term drawn from N (0, τ2) guarantees (, δ)-differential
privacy. Since there are infinitely many (, δ) pairs that yield the same τ2, we
parameterize our methods using τ2 [44] in this paper.
3 Correlation Assisted Private Estimation
3.1 Conventional Approach to Distributed DP Computa-
tions
We now describe the problem with conventional distributed DP and the CAPE
approach to improve performance [44]. Suppose we want to compute the average
of N data samples. Each sample xn is a scalar with xn ∈ [0, 1]. We denote the
vector of N data samples as x = [x1, . . . , xN−1, xN ]
>
. We are interested in
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computing the (, δ)-DP estimate of the mean function: f(x) = 1N
∑N
n=1 xn.
To compute the sensitivity [1] of the scalar-valued function f(x), we consider a
neighboring data vector x′ = [x1, . . . , xN−1, x′N ]
>
. We observe |f(x)− f(x′)| =
1
N |xN − x′N | ≤ 1N , which follows from the assumption xn ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
to compute the (, δ)-DP estimate of the average a = f(x), we can employ
the Gaussian mechanism [1, 45] to release aˆ = a + e, where e ∼ N (0, τ2) and
τ = 1N
√
2 log 1.25δ .
Each site s holds Ns samples xs ∈ RNs (see Figure 1(a)). We assume
Ns =
N
S for simplicity. To compute the global average non-privately, the sites
can send as = f(xs) to the aggregator and the average computed by aggregator
(aconv =
1
S
∑S
s=1 as) is exactly equal to the average we would get if all the
data samples were available in the aggregator node. However, with the privacy
concern and considering that the aggregator is honest-but-curious, the sites can
employ the conventional distributed DP computation technique. That is, the
sites will release (send to the aggregator node) an (, δ)-DP estimate of the
function f(xs) of their local data xs. More specifically, each site will generate a
noise es ∼ N
(
0, τ2s
)
and release/send aˆs = f(xs) + es to the aggregator, where
τs =
1
Ns
√
2 log
1.25
δ
=
S
N
√
2 log
1.25
δ
.
The aggregator can then compute the (, δ)-DP approximate average as aconv =
1
S
∑S
s=1 aˆs. We observe
aconv =
1
S
S∑
s=1
aˆs =
1
S
S∑
s=1
as +
1
S
S∑
s=1
es.
The variance of the estimator aconv is S · τ
2
s
S2
=
τ2s
S
, τ2conv. However, if we
had all the data samples at the aggregator (pooled-data scenario), we could
compute the (, δ)-DP estimate of the average as apool =
1
N
∑N
n=1 xn + epool,
where epool ∼ N
(
0, τ2pool
)
and τpool =
1
N
√
2 log 1.25δ =
τs
S . We observe the
ratio
τ2pool
τ2conv
=
τ2s
S2
τ2s
S
=
1
S
.
That is, the distributed DP averaging scheme will always result in a worse
performance than the DP pooled data case.
3.2 Proposed Scheme: CAPE
Trust/Collusion Model. In our proposed CAPE scheme, we assume that
all of the S sites and the central node follow the protocol honestly. However,
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Algorithm 1 Generate zero-sum noise
Require: Local noise variances {τ2s }; security parameter λ, threshold value t
1: Each site generate eˆs ∼ N (0, τ2s )
2: Aggregator computes
∑S
s=1 eˆs according to SecureAgg(λ, t) [39]
3: Aggregator broadcasts
∑S
s=1 eˆs to all sites s ∈ {1, . . . , S}
4: Each site computes es = eˆs − 1S
∑S
s′=1 eˆs′
5: return es
up to SC =
⌈
S
3
⌉ − 1 sites can collude with an adversary to learn about some
site’s data/function output. The central node is also honest-but-curious (and
therefore, can collude with an adversary). An adversary can observe the outputs
from each site, as well as the output from the aggregator. Additionally, the
adversary can know everything about the colluding sites (including their private
data). We denote the number of non-colluding sites with SH such that S =
SC + SH . Without loss of generality, we designate the non-colluding sites with
{1, . . . , SH} (see Figure 1(b)).
Correlated Noise. We design the noise generation procedure such that: i) we
can ensure (, δ) differential privacy of the algorithm output from each site and
ii) achieve the noise level of the pooled data scenario in the final output from the
aggregator. We achieve that by employing a correlated noise addition scheme.
Considering the same distributed averaging problem as Section 3.1, we intend
to release (and send to the aggregator) aˆs = f(xs) + es + gs from each site s,
where es and gs are two noise terms. The variances of es and gs are chosen to
ensure that the noise es + gs is sufficient to guarantee (, δ)-differential privacy
to f(xs). Here, each site generates the noise gs ∼ N (0, τ2g ) locally and the noise
es ∼ N (0, τ2e ) jointly with all other sites such that
∑S
s=1 es = 0. We employ
the recently proposed secure aggregation protocol (SecureAgg) by Bonawitz et
al. [39] to generate es that ensures
∑S
s=1 es = 0. The SecureAgg protocol utilizes
Shamir’s t-out-of-n secret sharing [46] and is communication-efficient.
Detailed Description of CAPE Protocol. In our proposed scheme, each site
s ∈ [S] generates a noise term eˆs ∼ N (0, τ2s ) independently. The aggregator
computes
∑S
s=1 eˆs according to the SecureAgg protocol and broadcasts it to all
the sites. Each site then sets es = eˆs− 1S
∑S
s′=1 eˆs′ to achieve
∑S
s=1 es = 0. We
show the complete noise generation procedure in Algorithm 1. Note that, the
original SecureAgg protocol is intended for computing sum of D-dimensional
vectors in a finite field ZDλ . However, we need to perform the summation of
Gaussian random variables over R or RD. To accomplish this, each site can
employ a mapping map : R 7→ Zλ that performs a stochastic quantization [47]
for large-enough λ. The aggregator can compute the sum in the finite field
according to SecureAgg and then invoke a reverse mapping remap : Zλ 7→ R
before broadcasting
∑S
s=1 eˆs to the sites. Algorithm 1 can be readily extended
to generate array-valued zero-sum noise terms. We observe that the variance of
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Algorithm 2 Correlation Assisted Private Estimation (CAPE)
Require: Data samples {xs}, local noise variances {τ2s }
1: for s = 1, . . . , S do . at each site
2: Generate es according to Algorithm 1
3: Generate gs ∼ N (0, τ2g ) with τ2g = τ
2
s
S
4: Compute and send aˆs ← f(xs) + es + gs
5: end for
6: Compute acape ← 1S
∑S
s=1 aˆs . at the aggregator
7: return acape
es is given by
τ2e = E
(eˆs − 1
S
S∑
s′=1
eˆs′
)2 = (1− 1
S
)
τ2s . (2)
Additionally, we choose
τ2g =
τ2s
S
. (3)
Each site then generates the noise gs ∼ N (0, τ2g ) independently and sends aˆs =
f(xs) + es + gs to the aggregator. Note that neither of the terms es and gs
has large enough variance to provide (, δ)-DP guarantee to f(xs). However,
we chose the variances of es and gs to ensure that the es + gs is sufficient to
ensure a DP guarantee to f(xs) at site s. The chosen variance of gs also ensures
that the output from the aggregator would have the same noise variance as the
differentially private pooled-data scenario. To see this, observe that we compute
the following at the aggregator (in Step 6 of Algorithm 2):
acape =
1
S
S∑
s=1
aˆs =
1
S
S∑
s=1
f(xs) +
1
S
S∑
s=1
gs,
where we used
∑
s es = 0. The variance of the estimator acape is τ
2
cape =
S · τ
2
g
S2 = τ
2
pool, which is the exactly the same as if all the data were present at
the aggregator. This claim is formalized in Lemma 1. We show the complete
algorithm in Algorithm 2. The privacy of Algorithm 2 is given by Theorem 1.
The communication cost of the CAPE scheme is discussed in Appendix A in the
Supplement.
Theorem 1 (Privacy of CAPE Algorithm (Algorithm 2)). Consider Algorithm 2
in the distributed data setting of Section 2 with Ns =
N
S and τ
2
s = τ
2 for all sites
s ∈ [S]. Suppose that at most SC =
⌈
S
3
⌉ − 1 sites can collude after execution.
Then Algorithm 2 guarantees (, δ)-differential privacy for each site, where (, δ)
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satisfy the relation δ = 2 σz−µz φ
(
−µz
σz
)
, φ(·) is the density for standard Normal
random variable and (µz, σz) are given by
µz =
S3
2τ2N2(1 + S)
(
S − SC + 2
S − SC +
9
S−SC S
2
C
S(1 + S)− 3S2C
)
, (4)
σ2z =
S3
τ2N2(1 + S)
(
S − SC + 2
S − SC +
9
S−SC S
2
C
S(1 + S)− 3S2C
)
. (5)
Remark 1. Theorem 1 is stated for the symmetric setting: Ns =
N
S and τ
2
s =
τ2 ∀s ∈ [S]. As with many algorithms using the approximate differential privacy,
the guarantee holds for a range of (, δ) pairs subject to a tradeoff constraint
between  and δ, as in the simple case in (1).
Proof. As mentioned before, we identify the SH non-colluding sites with s ∈
{1, . . . , SH} , SH and the SC colluding sites with s ∈ {SH + 1, . . . , S} , SC .
The adversary can observe the outputs from each site (including the aggregator).
Additionally, the colluding sites can share their private data and the noise terms,
eˆs and gs for s ∈ SC , with the adversary. For simplicity, we assume that all
sites have equal number of samples (i.e., Ns =
N
S ) and τ
2
s = τ
2.
To infer the private data of the sites s ∈ SH , the adversary can observe
aˆ = [aˆ1, . . . , aˆSH ]
> ∈ RSH and eˆ = ∑s∈SH eˆs. Note that the adversary can learn
the partial sum eˆ because they can get the sum
∑
s eˆs from the aggregator and
the noise terms {eˆSH+1, . . . , eˆS} from the colluding sites. Therefore, the vector
y =
[
aˆ>, eˆ
]> ∈ RSH+1 is what the adversary can observe to make inference
about the non-colluding sites. To prove differential privacy guarantee, we must
show that
∣∣∣log g(y|a)g(y|a′) ∣∣∣ ≤  holds with probability (over the randomness of the
mechanism) at least 1 − δ. Here, a = [f(x1), . . . , f(xSH )]> and g(·|a) and
g(·|a′) are the probability density functions of y under a and a′, respectively.
The vectors a and a′ differ in only one coordinate (neighboring). Without loss
of generality, we assume that a and a′ differ in the first coordinate. We note
that the maximum difference is 1Ns as the sensitivity of the function f(xs) is
1
Ns
. Recall that we release aˆs = f(xs) + es + gs from each site. We observe
∀s ∈ [S]: E(aˆs) = f(xs), var(aˆs) = τ2. Additionally, ∀s1 6= s2 ∈ [S], we have:
E(aˆs1 aˆs2) = f(xs1)f(xs2) − τ
2
S . That is, the random variable aˆ is N (a,Σaˆ),
where Σaˆ = (1 +
1
S )τ
2I − 11> τ2S ∈ RSH×SH and 1 is a vector of all ones.
Without loss of generality, we can assume [45] that a = 0 and a′ = a−v, where
v =
[
1
Ns
, 0, . . . , 0
]>
. Additionally, the random variable eˆ is N (0, τ2eˆ ), where
τ2eˆ = SHτ
2. Therefore, g(y|a) is the density of N (0,Σ), where
Σ =
Σaˆ Σaˆeˆ
Σ>aˆeˆ τ
2
eˆ
 ∈ R(SH+1)×(SH+1).
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With some simple algebra, we can find the expression for Σaˆeˆ: Σaˆeˆ =
(
1− SHS
)
τ21 ∈
RSH . If we denote v˜ =
[
v>, 0
]> ∈ RSH+1 then we observe∣∣∣∣log g(y|a)g(y|a′)
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣−12 (y>Σ−1y − (y + v˜)>Σ−1 (y + v˜))
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣12 (2y>Σ−1v˜ + v˜>Σ−1v˜)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣y>Σ−1v˜ + 12 v˜>Σ−1v˜
∣∣∣∣ = |z|,
where z = y>Σ−1v˜ + 12 v˜
>Σ−1v˜. Using the matrix inversion lemma for block
matrices [48, Section 0.7.3] and some algebra, we have
Σ−1 =
Σ−1aˆ + 1KΣ−1aˆ ΣaˆeˆΣ>aˆeˆΣ−1aˆ − 1KΣ−1aˆ Σaˆeˆ
− 1KΣ>aˆeˆΣ−1aˆ 1K
 ,
where Σ−1aˆ =
S
(1+S)τ2
(
I + 2SH 11
>
)
and K = τ2eˆ − Σ>aˆeˆΣ−1aˆ Σaˆeˆ. Note that z
is a Gaussian random variable N (µz, σ2z) with parameters µz = 12 v˜>Σ−1v˜ and
σ2z = v˜
>Σ−1v˜ given by (4) and (5), respectively. Now, we observe
Pr
[∣∣∣∣log g(y|a)g(y|a′)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ] = Pr [|z| ≤ ] = 1− 2 Pr [z > ]
= 1− 2Q
(
− µz
σz
)
> 1− 2 σz
− µz φ
(
− µz
σz
)
,
where Q(·) is the Q-function [49] and φ(·) is the density for standard Normal
random variable. The last inequality follows from the bound Q(x) < φ(x)x [49].
Therefore, the proposed CAPE ensures (, δ)-DP with δ = 2 σz−µz φ
(
−µz
σz
)
for
each site, assuming that the number of colluding sites is at-most
⌈
S
3
⌉ − 1. As
the local datasets are disjoint and differential privacy is invariant under post
processing, the release of acape also satisfies (, δ)-DP.
Remark 2. We use the SecureAgg protocol [39] to generate the zero-sum noise
terms by mapping floating point numbers to a finite field. Such mappings are
shown to be vulnerable to certain attacks [50]. However, the floating point im-
plementation issues are out of scope for this paper. We refer the reader to the
work of Balcer and Vadhan [51] for possible remedies. We believe a very inter-
esting direction of future work would be to address the issue in our distributed
data setting.
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3.3 Utility Analysis
The goal is to ensure (, δ)-DP for each site and achieve τ2cape = τ
2
pool at the
aggregator (see Lemma 1). The CAPE protocol guarantees (, δ)-DP with δ =
2 σz−µz φ
(
−µz
σz
)
. We claim that this δ guarantee is much better than the δ
guarantee in the conventional distributed DP scheme. We empirically validate
this claim by comparing δ with δconv in Appendix B in the Supplement. Here,
δconv is the smallest δ guarantee we can afford in the conventional distributed
DP scheme to achieve the same noise variance as the pooled-data scenario for a
given . Additionally, we empirically compare δ and δconv for weaker collusion
assumptions in Appendix C in the Supplement. In both cases, we observe that
δ is always smaller than δconv. That is, for achieving the same noise level at the
aggregator output (and therefore the same utility) as the pooled data scenario,
we are ensuring a much better privacy guarantee by employing the CAPE scheme
over the conventional approach.
Lemma 1. Consider the symmetric setting: Ns =
N
S and τ
2
s = τ
2 for all sites
s ∈ [S]. Let the variances of the noise terms es and gs (Step 4 of Algorithm
2) be τ2e =
(
1− 1S
)
τ2 and τ2g =
τ2
S , respectively. If we denote the variance of
the additive noise (for preserving privacy) in the pooled data scenario by τ2pool
and the variance of the estimator acape (Step 6 of Algorithm 2) by τ
2
cape then
Algorithm 2 achieves the same expected error as the pooled-data scenario (i.e.,
τ2pool = τ
2
cape).
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix D in the Supplement.
Proposition 1. (Performance gain) If the local noise variances are {τ2s } for
s ∈ [S] then the CAPE algorithm achieves a gain of G = τ2convτ2cape = S, where τ
2
conv
and τ2cape are the noise variances of the final estimate at the aggregator in the
conventional distributed DP scheme and the CAPE scheme, respectively.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix E in the Supplement.
Note that, even in the case of site drop-out, we achieve
∑
s es = 0, as long as
the number of active sites is above some threshold (see Bonawitz et al. [39] for
details). Therefore, the performance gain of CAPE remains the same irrespective
of the number of dropped-out sites.
Remark 3 (Unequal Sample Sizes at Sites). Note that the CAPE algorithm
achieves the same noise variance as the pooled-data scenario (i.e., τ2cape = τ
2
pool)
in the symmetric setting: Ns =
N
S and τ
2
s = τ
2 for all sites s ∈ [S]. In gen-
eral, the ratio H(n) =
τ2cape
τ2pool
, where n , [N1, N2, . . . , NS ], is a function of
the sample sizes in the sites. We observe: H(n) = N
2
S3
∑S
s=1
1
N2s
. As H(n) is
a Schur-convex function, it can be shown using majorization theory [52] that
1 ≤ H(n) ≤ N2S3
(
1
(N−S+1)2 + S − 1
)
, where the minimum is achieved for the
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symmetric setting. That is, CAPE achieves the smallest noise variance at the
aggregator in the symmetric setting. For distributed systems with unequal sam-
ple sizes at the sites and/or different Ns and τs at each site, we compute the
weighted sum acape =
∑S
s=1 wsaˆs at the aggregator. In order to achieve the
same noise level as the pooled data scenario, we need to ensure
∑S
s=1 wses = 0
and var [
∑s
s=1 wsgs] = τ
2
pool. A scheme for doing so is shown in [44]. In this
paper, we keep the analysis for the case Ns =
N
S ,∀s ∈ [S] for simplicity.
3.4 Scope of CAPE
CAPE is motivated by scientific research collaborations that are common in
medicine and biology. Privacy regulations prevent sites from sharing the local
raw data. Additionally, the data is often high dimensional (e.g., in neuroimag-
ing) and sites have small sample sizes. Joint learning across datasets can yield
discoveries that are impossible to obtain from a single site. CAPE can benefit
functions f with sensitivities satisfying some conditions (see Proposition 2). In
addition to the averaging function, many functions of interest have sensitivities
that satisfy such conditions. Examples include the empirical average loss func-
tions used in machine learning and deep neural networks. Additionally, we can
use the Stone-Weierstrass theorem [43] to approximate a loss function f and ap-
ply CAPE, as we show in Section 4.5. Furthermore, we can use the nomographic
representation of functions to approximate a desired function in a decentralized
manner [53–56] (for applications in communications [57–60]), while keeping the
data differentially private. More common applications include gradient based
optimization algorithms, k-means clustering and estimating probability distri-
butions.
Proposition 2. Consider a distributed setting with S > 1 sites in which site
s ∈ [S] has a dataset Ds of Ns samples and
∑S
s=1Ns = N . Suppose the sites
are computing a function f(D) with Lp sensitivity ∆(N) employing the CAPE
scheme. Denote n = [N1, N2, . . . , NS ] and observe the ratio H(n) =
τ2cape
τ2pool
=∑S
s=1 ∆
2(Ns)
S3∆2(N) . Then the CAPE protocol achieves H(n) = 1, if
• for convex ∆(N) we have: ∆ (NS ) = S∆(N)
• for general ∆(N) we have: S3∆2(N) = ∑Ss=1 ∆2(Ns).
Proof. We review some definitions and lemmas [52, Proposition C.2] necessary
for the proof in Appendix F in the Supplement. As the sites are computing
the function f with Lp sensitivity ∆(N), the local noise standard deviation
for preserving privacy is proportional to ∆(Ns) by Gaussian mechanism [1].
It can be written as: τs = ∆(Ns)C, where C is a constant for a given (, δ)
pair. Similarly, the noise standard deviation in the pooled data scenario can be
written as: τpool = ∆(N)C. Now, the final noise variance at the aggregator for
CAPE protocol is: τ2cape =
∑S
s=1
τ2g
S2 =
1
S3
∑S
s=1 ∆
2(Ns)C
2. Now, we observe
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the ratio: H(n) =
τ2cape
τ2pool
=
∑S
s=1 ∆
2(Ns)
S3∆2(N) . As we want to achieve the same noise
variance as the pooled-data scenario, we need S3∆2(N) =
∑S
s=1 ∆
2(Ns), which
proves the case for general sensitivity function ∆(N). Now, if ∆2(N) is convex
then the by Lemma 2 (Supplement) the function K(n) =
∑S
s=1 ∆
2(Ns) is Schur-
convex. Thus the minimum of K(n) is obtained when n = nsym. We observe:
Kmin(n) =
∑S
s=1 ∆
2
(
N
S
)
= S · ∆2 (NS ). Therefore, when ∆(N) is convex, we
achieve H(n) = 1 if ∆(NS ) = S∆(N).
4 Application of CAPE: Distributed Computa-
tion of Functions
As mentioned before, the CAPE framework can benefit any distributed differ-
entially private function computation, as long as the sensitivity of the func-
tion satisfies the conditions outlined in Proposition 2. In this section, we pro-
pose an algorithm that is specifically suited for privacy-preserving computa-
tion of cost functions in distributed settings. Let us consider a cost function
fD(w) : RD 7→ R that depends on private data distributed across S sites. A
central aggregator (see Figure 1) wishes find the minimizer w∗ of fD(w). This is
a common scenario in distributed machine learning. Now, the aggregator is not
trusted and the sites may collude with an adversary to learn information about
the other sites. Since computing the w∗ by minimizing the expected cost/loss
involves the sensitive information of the local datasets, we need to ensure that
w∗ is computed in a privacy-preserving way. In particular, we want to develop
an algorithm to compute the (, δ) differentially private approximate to w∗, de-
noted wˆ∗, in a distributed setting that produces a result as close as possible to
the non-private pooled w∗.
Inline with our discussions in the previous sections, let us assume that each
site s ∈ [S] holds a dataset Ds of Ns samples xs,n ∈ RD. The total sample
size across all sites is N =
∑S
s=1Ns. The cost incurred by a w ∈ RD due to
one data sample xs,n is f(xs,n; w) : RD × RD 7→ R. We need to minimize the
average cost to find the optimal w∗. The empirical average cost for a particular
w over all the samples is expressed as
fD(w) =
1
N
S∑
s=1
Ns∑
n=1
f(xs,n; w). (6)
Therefore, we have
w∗ = arg min
w
fD(w) = arg min
w
1
N
S∑
s=1
Ns∑
n=1
f(xs,n; w).
For centralized optimization, we can find a differentially-private approximate
to w∗ using output perturbation [17] or objective perturbation [14, 17]. We
13
propose using the functional mechanism [28], which is a form of objective per-
turbation and is more amenable to distributed implementation. It uses a poly-
nomial representation of the cost function and can be used for any differen-
tiable and continuous cost function. We perturb each term in the polynomial
representation of fD(w) to get modified cost function fˆD(w). The minimizer
wˆ∗ = arg minw fˆD(w) guarantees differential privacy.
4.1 Functional Mechanism
We first review the functional mechanism [28] in the pooled data case. Suppose
φ(w) is a monomial function of the entries of w: φ(w) = wc11 w
c2
2 . . . w
cD
D , for
some set of exponents {cd : d ∈ [D]} ⊆ N. Let us define the set Φj of all φ(w)
with degree j as
Φj =
{
wc11 w
c2
2 . . . w
cD
D :
D∑
d=1
cd = j
}
.
For example, Φ0 = {1}, Φ1 = {w1, w2, . . . , wD}, Φ2 = {wd1wd2 : d1, d2 ∈ [D]},
etc. Now, from the Stone-Weierstrass Theorem [43], any differentiable and
continuous cost function f(xn; w) can be written as a (potentially infinite) sum
of monomials of {wd}:
f(xn; w) =
J∑
j=0
∑
φ∈Φj
λnφφ(w),
for some J ∈ [0,∞]. Here, λnφ denotes the coefficient of φ(w) in the polynomial
and is a function of the n-th data sample. Plugging the expression of f(xn; w)
in (6), we can express the empirical average cost over all N samples as
fD(w) =
J∑
j=0
∑
φ∈Φj
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
λnφ
)
φ(w). (7)
The function fD(w) depends on the data samples only through {λnφ}. As the
goal is to approximate fD(w) in a differentially-private way, one can compute
these λnφ to satisfy differential privacy [28]. Let us consider two “neighboring”
datasets: D = {x1, . . . , xN−1, xN} and D′ = {x1, . . . , xN−1, x′N}, differing
in a single data point (i.e., the last one). Zhang et al. [28] computed the L1
sensitivity ∆dp−fm as∥∥∥∥∥∥
J∑
j=0
∑
φ∈Φj
1
N
(∑
D
λnφ −
∑
D′
λnφ
)∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
N
max
n
J∑
j=0
∑
φ∈Φj
‖λnφ‖1 , ∆dp−fm,
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Algorithm 3 Improved Functional Mechanism
Require: Data samples {xn}; cost function fD(w) as in (8); privacy parame-
ters , δ
1: for j = 0, 1, . . . , J do
2: Compute Λj as shown in Section 4.2
3: Compute ∆j ← maxD,D′ ‖ΛDj − ΛD
′
j ‖F
4: Compute τj =
∆j

√
2 log 1.25δ
5: Compute Λˆj ← Λj+ej , where ej have same dimensions as Λj and entries
of ej are i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ2j )
6: end for
7: Compute fˆD(w) =
∑J
j=0〈Λˆj , φ¯j〉
8: return fˆD(w)
and proposed an -differentially private method that adds Laplace noise with
variance 2
(
∆dp−fm

)2
to each
∑
D λnφ for all φ ∈ Φj and for all j ∈ {0, . . . , J}.
In the following, we propose an improved functional mechanism that employs a
tighter characterization of the sensitivities and can be extended to incorporate
the CAPE protocol for the distributed settings.
4.2 Improved Functional Mechanism
Our method is an improved version of the functional mechanism [28]. We
use the Gaussian mechanism [45] for computing the (, δ)-DP approximate of
fD(w). This gives a weaker privacy guarantee than the original functional
mechanism [28], which used Laplace noise for -DP. Our distributed function
computation method (described in Section 4.5) benefits from the fact that linear
combinations of Gaussians are Gaussian. In other words, the proposed CAPE
and the distributed functional mechanism rely on the Gaussianity of the noise.
Now, instead of computing the L2-sensitivity of λnφ, we define an array Λj that
contains 1N
∑N
n=1 λnφ as its entries for all φ(w) ∈ Φj . We used the term “array”
instead of vector or matrix or tensor because the dimension of Λj depends on the
cardinality |Φj | of the set Φj . We can represent Λj as a scalar for j = 0 (because
Φ0 = {1}), as a D-dimensional vector for j = 1 (because Φ1 = {wd : d ∈ [D]}),
and as a D × D matrix for j = 2 (because Φ2 = {wd1wd2 : d1, d2 ∈ [D]}).
Additionally, we use φ¯j to denote the array containing all φ(w) ∈ Φj as its en-
tries. The arrays φ¯j and Λj have the same dimensions and number of elements.
Rewriting the objective, we observe
fD(w) =
J∑
j=0
∑
φ∈Φj
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
λnφ
)
φ(w) =
J∑
j=0
〈Λj , φ¯j〉. (8)
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We define the L2-sensitivity of Λj as
∆j = maxD,D′
‖ΛDj − ΛD
′
j ‖F , (9)
where ΛDj and Λ
D′
j are computed on neighboring datasets D and D′, respectively.
Now, we use the Gaussian mechanism to get an (, δ)-DP approximation to Λj
as: Λˆj = Λj + ej , where ej is a noise array with the same dimensions as Λj
and its entries are drawn i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ2j ). Here τj = ∆j
√
2 log 1.25δ . As the
function fD(w) depends on the data only through {Λj}, the computation
fˆD(w) =
J∑
j=0
〈Λˆj , φ¯j〉 (10)
satisfies (, δ) differential privacy. We show the proposed improved functional
mechanism in Algorithm 3.
Theorem 2. Consider Algorithm 3 with input parameters (, δ) and the function
fD(w) represented as (8). Then Algorithm 3 computes an (, δ) differentially
private approximation fˆD(w) to fD(w). Consequently, the minimizer wˆ
∗ =
arg minw fˆD(w) satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix G in the Supplement.
4.3 Example – Linear Regression
In this section, we demonstrate the proposed improved functional mechanism in
the centralized setting using a linear regression problem. We show that Algo-
rithm 3 achieves much better utility at the price of a weaker privacy guarantee
((, δ)-DP vs -DP). The main reason for this performance improvement is due to
defining the sensitivities of Λj separately for each j, instead of using an uniform
conservative upper-bound ∆dp−fm (as in [28]). We demonstrate the proposed
improved functional mechanism for a logistic regression problem in Appendix H
in the Supplement.
We have a dataset D with N samples of the form (xn, yn), where xn ∈ RD
is the feature vector and yn ∈ R is the response. Without loss of generality, we
assume that ‖xn‖2 ≤ 1 and yn ∈ [−1, 1]. We want to find a vector w ∈ RD such
that x>nw ≈ yn for all n ∈ [N ]. The cost function f : RD × RD 7→ R+ due to
each sample and a particular w is the squared loss: f(xn,w) =
(
yn − x>nw
)2
.
The empirical average cost function is defined as
fD(w) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
f(xn,w) =
1
N
‖y −Xw‖2F , (11)
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where y ∈ RN contains all yn and X ∈ RN×D contains x>n as its rows. By
simple algebra, it can be shown that
fD(w) =
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
y2n
)
+
D∑
d=1
(
− 2
N
N∑
n=1
ynxnd
)
wd
+
D∑
d1=1
D∑
d2=1
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
xnd1xnd2
)
wd1wd2 ,
where xpq is the q-th element of the p-th sample vector or xpq = [X]pq. Now,
we have
Λ0 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
y2n =
1
N
‖y‖22
Λ1 = − 2
N

∑N
n=1 ynxn1
...∑N
n=1 ynxnD
 = − 2N (1>diag(y)X)>
Λ2 =
1
N

∑N
n=1 x
2
n1 · · ·
∑N
n=1 xn1xnD
...
. . .
...∑N
n=1 xnDxn1 · · ·
∑N
n=1 x
2
nD
 = X>XN ,
where 1 is an N -dimensional vector of all 1’s and diag(y) is an N ×N diagonal
matrix with the elements of y as diagonal entries. Additionally, we write out
the {φ¯j} for completeness
φ¯0 = 1, φ¯1 =

w1
...
wD
 , and
φ¯2 =

w21 w1w2 · · · w1wD
...
...
. . .
...
wDw1 wDw2 · · · w2D
 .
Therefore, we can express fD(w) as fD(w) =
∑2
j=0〈Λj , φ¯j〉. Now, we focus on
finding the sensitivities of {Λj}. Let us consider a neighboring dataset D′ which
contains the same tuples as D, except for the last one, i.e. (x′N , y′N ). We have∣∣∣ΛD0 − ΛD′0 ∣∣∣ = 1N (y2N − y′N 2) ≤ 1N , ∆0,
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where the inequality follows from the fact that yn ∈ [−1, 1]. Next, we observe∥∥∥ΛD1 − ΛD′1 ∥∥∥
2
=
2
N
‖a− a′‖2 ≤ 4
N
, ∆1,
where a = yNxN and a
′ = y′Nx
′
N . Here, we used the inequality ‖a‖2 ≤ 1 as
−1 ≤ yn ≤ 1, ‖xn‖2 ≤ 1. Similarly, ‖a′‖2 ≤ 1. Finally, we observe∥∥∥ΛD2 − ΛD′2 ∥∥∥
F
=
1
N
∥∥∥X>X−X′>X′∥∥∥
F
=
1
N
∥∥∥xNx>N − x′Nx′N>∥∥∥
F
≤
√
2
N
, ∆2,
where the last inequality follows from realizing that the D ×D symmetric ma-
trix xNx
>
N − x′Nx′N> is at most rank-2. Therefore, we can write its eigen-
decomposition as:∥∥∥xNx>N − x′Nx′N>∥∥∥
F
=
∥∥UΣU>∥∥
F
≤ ‖U‖2F ‖Σ‖F = ‖Σ‖F ≤
√
2.
Now that we have computed the L2-sensitivities of {Λj}, we can compute {Λˆj}
and thus, the (, δ)-DP approximation fˆD(w) following Algorithm 3. Note that
if we employed the sensitivity computation technique as in [28], the sensitivity
for each entry of Λj would be ∆
dp−fm = 2(D+1)
2
N , which is orders of magnitude
larger than ∆j for any meaningful D > 1 and for all j ∈ {0, . . . , J}. Therefore,
with the sensitivity computation proposed in this work, we can achieve fˆD(w)
with much less noise. This results in a more accurate privacy-preserving estimate
of the optimal wˆ∗ = arg minw fˆD(w), which we demonstrate empirically in
Section 5.
4.4 Distributed Functional Mechanism
In this section, we first we describe a conventional approach. Inline with Section
3.1, we show that the conventional approach would always result in sub-optimal
performance due to larger noise added to the cost function. Then we present
the proposed algorithm (capeFM) in detail (see Algorithm 4).
Conventional Approach. Recall the distributed setting, where we have S
different sites and a central aggregator, as depicted in Figure 1. The aggregator
is not trusted. The goal is to compute the differentially private minimizer wˆ∗ in
this distributed setting. We assume that the datasets in the sites (Ds for s ∈ [S])
are disjoint and Ns =
N
S . Recall that the cost function fD(w) depends on the
data only through the {Λj} for j ∈ {0, . . . , J}. One na¨ıve way to compute wˆ∗
at the aggregator is the following: the sites use local data to compute and send
the (, δ) differentially-private approximates of {Λsj}, denoted {Λˆsj}, to the ag-
gregator. The aggregator combines these quantities to compute {Λˆj} and hence
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fˆD(w). The aggregator can then compute and release wˆ
∗ = arg minw fˆD(w).
More specifically, each site s computes Λˆsj = Λ
s
j + e
s
j , where e
s
j is an array with
the same dimensions as Λsj and the entries are drawn i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τsj 2). Here,
τsj =
∆sj

√
2 log
1.25
δ
,
and ∆sj = maxDs,D′s ‖Λs,Dsj − Λ
s,D′s
j ‖F , where Λs,Dsj and Λs,D
′
s
j are computed on
neighboring datasets Ds and D′s, respectively. Recall that Λ
s,Ds
j (and similarly
Λ
s,D′s
j ) is an array of |Φj | elements containing 1Ns
∑Ns
n=1 λnφ as its entries for all
φ(w) ∈ Φj . The sites send these {Λˆsj} to the aggregator. The aggregator then
computes
Λˆconvj =
1
S
S∑
s=1
Λˆsj =
1
S
S∑
s=1
Λsj +
1
S
S∑
s=1
esj .
The variance of the estimator Λˆconvj is S ·
τsj
2
S2 =
τsj
2
S , τ convj
2. However, if we
had all the data samples at the aggregator (centralized/pooled data scenario),
we could compute the (, δ)-DP approximates of {Λj} as Λˆj = Λj + ej , where
ej is an array with the same dimensions as Λj and the entries are drawn i.i.d.
∼ N (0, τpoolj
2
). The noise standard deviation τpoolj is given by:
τpoolj =
∆poolj

√
2 log
1.25
δ
,
where ∆poolj = maxD,D′ ‖ΛDj −ΛD
′
j ‖F . Now, ΛDj is an |Φj |-dimensional array with
entries 1N
∑N
n=1 λnφ for all φ(w) ∈ Φj . Clearly
∆poolj
∆sj
= 1/N1/Ns =
1
S , which implies
τpoolj =
τsj
S . For this case, we observe the ratio
τpoolj
2
τconvj
2 =
τsj
2/S2
τsj
2/S =
1
S , which is
exactly the same as the distributed problem of Section 3.1.
4.5 Proposed Distributed Functional Mechanism (capeFM)
Our proposed method, capeFM, is described in Algorithm 4 and is based on
the CAPE scheme described in Section 3.2. We exploit the correlated noise to
achieve the same performance of the pooled data case (Lemma 1) in the sym-
metric decentralized setting under the honest-but-curious model for the sites.
Recall our assumption that all parties follow the protocol and the number of
colluding sites is not more than dS/3e − 1. The sites collectively generate the
noise esj with entries i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τsje2), according to Algorithm 1, such that∑S
s=1 e
s
j = 0 holds for all j ∈ {0, . . . , J}. The local sites also generate noise gsj
with entries i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τsjg2). From each site s, we release (or send to the
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Algorithm 4 Proposed Distributed Functional Mechanism (capeFM)
Require: Data samples {xs,n}; cost function fD(w) as in (8); local noise vari-
ances {τsj } for all j ∈ {0, . . . , J}
1: for s = 1, . . . , S do
2: for j = 0, 1, . . . , J do
3: Compute Λj as described in Section 4.2
4: Generate esj according to Algorithm 1 (entrywise)
5: Compute τsjg
2 ← τ
s
j
2
S
6: Generate gsj with entries i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τsjg2)
7: Compute Λˆsj ← Λsj + esj + gsj
8: end for
9: end for
10: At the central aggregator, compute for all j ∈ {0, . . . , J}: Λˆj ← 1S
∑S
s=1 Λˆ
s
j
11: Compute fˆD(w)←
∑J
j=0〈Λˆj , φ¯j〉
12: return fˆD(w)
central aggregator): Λˆsj = Λ
s
j + e
s
j + g
s
j for all j ∈ {0, . . . , J}. Note that esj and
gsj are arrays of the same dimension as Λ
s
j . As described in Section 3.2, we have
τsje
2 =
(
1− 1
S
)
τsj
2, and τsjg
2 =
τsj
2
S
. (12)
Now, at the aggregator we compute the following quantity
Λˆj =
1
S
S∑
s=1
Λˆsj =
1
S
S∑
s=1
Λsj +
1
S
S∑
s=1
gsj ,
because
∑
s e
s
j = 0. The aggregator then uses these {Λˆj} to compute fˆD(w)
and release wˆ∗ = arg minw fˆD(w). Privacy of capeFM follows directly from
Theorem 1. In the symmetric setting (i.e., Ns =
N
S and τ
s
j = τj for all sites
s ∈ [S] and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , J}), the noise variance at the aggregator is exactly
the same as that of the pooled data scenario (see Lemma 1 and Proposition 2).
Additionally, the performance gain of capeFM over any conventional distributed
functional mechanism is given by Proposition 1.
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we empirically show the effectiveness of the proposed CAPE and
capeFM algorithms with applications in a neural network based classifier and a
linear regression problem in distributed settings. Our CAPE algorithm can im-
prove a distributed computation if the target function has sensitivity satisfying
the conditions of Proposition 2. Additionally, the proposed capeFM algorithm
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Figure 2: Variation of performance of NN based classifier on synthetic data:
(a)–(b) with  per iteration; (c)–(d) with N . Fixed parameter: S = 4.
is well-suited for distributed optimization, as we can compute the DP approxi-
mate fˆD(w) of the loss function and then use any off-the-shelf optimizer. If the
function can be represented as (8), we can employ the capeFM algorithm for an
even better utility. However, finding such a representation may be challenging
for large neural networks. We first demonstrate the effectiveness of the CAPE
algorithm for a neural network based classifier with varying  and total sam-
ple size by comparing against the non-privacy-preserving pooled-data approach
(Non− priv.) and the conventional approach (conv) of distributed DP gradient
descent [19]. Then we demonstrate the effectiveness of the capeFM algorithm
using a distributed linear regression problem. We present experimental results
to show empirical comparison of performance of the proposed capeFM with the
existing dp− fm [28], objective perturbation (objPert) [17] and non-private lin-
ear regression (Non− priv.) on pooled-data. Note that both dp− fm and objPert
offer the stronger -DP and are applied to the pooled-data scenario. We also in-
cluded the performance variation of a conventional DP distributed scheme with
no correlated noise (conv) and a DP linear regression on local (single site) data
(local). For both the neural network based classifier and the linear regression
problem, we consider the symmetric setting (i.e., Ns =
N
S and τs = τ) and show
the average performance over 10 independent runs.
5.1 Distributed Neural Network-based Classifier
We evaluate the performance of the proposed CAPE scheme on a neural net-
work based classifier to classify between the two classes on a synthetic dataset.
The samples from the two classes are random Gaussian vectors with unit vari-
ance and the means are separated by 1. We have the same distributed setup
as mentioned before: data samples are distributed across S sites. Let Xs ∈
RD×Ns be the sample matrix at site s with Ns samples in D dimensions.
Let ys ∈ {0, 1}Ns contain the labels for each sample. The global sample
matrix and labels vector are given as X = [X1, . . . ,XS ] ∈ RD×N and y =[
y>1 , . . . ,y
>
S
]> ∈ RN , where N = ∑Ss=1Ns. We consider an L = 2 layer neu-
ral network and D = 50, N = 10k, S = 4. The number of units in layer
l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L} is denoted by D[l] with D[0] = D. We use Rectified Linear
Unit (ReLU) activation in the hidden layer and sigmoid activation in the out-
put layer. Our goal is to find the following parameters of the neural network:
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W[1] ∈ RD[1]×D[0] , b[1] ∈ RD[1] , W[2] ∈ RD[2]×D[1] and b[2] ∈ RD[2] , such that
round (yˆ) gives the labels of the samples with minimum deviation from y, where
yˆ = sigmoid
(
W[2]A[1] + b[2]
)
and A[1] = ReLU
(
W[1]X + b[1]
)
. We use dis-
tributed gradient descent to minimize the empirical average cross-entropy loss.
The cross-entropy loss for the n-th sample xn is:
l(yˆn, yn) = −yn log yˆn − (1− yn) log(1− yˆn). (13)
Each site evaluates the gradients on the local data and sends privacy-preserving
approximates of the gradients to the aggregator according to a Non− priv.,
CAPE or conv schemes. The aggregator then combines the gradient contribu-
tions and updates the parameters. For CAPE, we set τs =
∆

√
2 log 1.250.01 for all
experiments, where ∆ is the L2 sensitivity of the corresponding gradient. To
measure the utility of the estimated parameters, we use the percent accuracy
acc = 1Ntest
∑Ntest
n=1 I (round(yˆtest,n) = ytest,n)×100, where I(·) is the indicator
function and round (ytest) ∈ RNtest contains the labels of the test-set samples.
Performance Variation with  and N . We consider the privacy-utility
tradeoff first. In Figure 2(a)–(b), we show the variation of acc with  per iter-
ation on the train and test sets for the synthetic dataset, while keeping N and
S fixed. We observe that both of the privacy preserving algorithms: CAPE and
conv, perform better as we increase . The proposed CAPE algorithm performs
better than conv and reaches the performance of Non− priv. even for moderate
 values. Next, we consider the variation of acc with total sample size N , while
keeping  per iteration and S fixed. In Figure 2(c)–(d), we show the variation
of acc on the train and test sets. As in the case of varying , we observe that
increasing N (hence increasing Ns) improves acc for the privacy-preserving al-
gorithms. We recall that the variance of the noise added for privacy is inversely
proportional to N2 – therefore, availability of more samples results in better
accuracy for the same privacy level. Again, we observe that the proposed CAPE
algorithm outperforms the conv algorithm. However, when N is quite small,
the performance gap between CAPE and conv is less pronounced. In practice,
we observe that the gradient descent converges much faster under CAPE than
the conv, matching the performance of Non− priv. This can be explained by re-
calling the fact that the CAPE algorithm offers the benefit of much less additive
noise at the aggregator.
5.2 Distributed Linear Regression
To demonstrate the effectiveness of capeFM, we performed experiments on three
datasets: a synthetic dataset (D = 20 or D = 50) (Synth) generated with
a random w∗ and random samples X, the Communities and Crime dataset
(D = 101) [61] (Crime) and the Buzz in social media dataset (D = 77) [61]
(Twitter). We refer the reader to [61] for a detailed description of these real
datasets. Now, for each of the datasets, we normalized each feature across the
samples to ensure that each feature lies in the range [−1, 1]. We also normalized
the samples with the maximum L2 norm in each dataset to ensure ‖xn‖2 ≤ 1 ∀n.
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Figure 3: Variation of loss fD(w) at w
∗ for synthetic datasets. (a)–(b): with .
(c)–(d): with total samples N . (e)–(f): with δ. Fixed param.: S = 5.
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This preprocessing step is not differentially private but can be modified to satisfy
privacy at the cost of some utility. For capeFM, we set τsj =
∆sj

√
2 log 1.2510−5 for
experiments on the synthetic datasets and τsj =
∆sj

√
2 log 1.2510−3 for experiments
on the real datasets, where ∆sj is the L2 sensitivity of the corresponding Λj .
We use two performance indices for the synthetic dataset. The first one is the
empirical loss
fD(w) =
1
N
‖y −Xw‖22, (14)
where X and y contains all data tuples (Xs,ys) from s ∈ [S]. We compute
fD(w) at the final w, which is found from minimizing the output function of
the algorithm. The second one is closeness to the true w∗. If the final w
achieved by minimizing the output function of the algorithm is denoted by wˆ∗
then we define: errw =
1
D‖w∗ − wˆ∗‖2. As the true w∗ is unknown for the real
datasets, we only use fD(w) as the performance index for Crime and Twitter
datasets. The variation of errw with several parameters on synthetic datasets is
shown in Figure 7 in Appendix I in the Supplement.
Dependence on Privacy Parameter . First, we explore the trade-off be-
tween privacy and utility. We note that, as we employ the Gaussian mechanism,
the standard deviation of the added noise is inversely proportional to  – bigger 
means higher privacy risk but less noise and thus, better utility. We observe this
in our experiments as well. In Figure 3(a)–(b), we show the variation of fD(w)
of different algorithms for different values of  on synthetic data. For this exper-
iment, we kept the number of total samples N and the number of sites S fixed.
We show the plots for two different feature dimensions: D = 20 and D = 50.
For both of the synthetic datasets, we observe that as  increases (higher pri-
vacy risk), the loss fD(w) decreases. The proposed capeFM reaches very small
fD(w) for some parameter choices and clearly outperforms the dp− fm, objPert,
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conv and local. One of the reasons that capeFM outperforms conv is the smaller
noise variance at the aggregator that we can achieve due to the correlated noise
scheme. Moreover, capeFM outperforms dp− fm because dp− fm suffers from
a much larger variance at the aggregator (due to the conservative sensitivity
computation of λnφ). On the other hand, objPert also entails addition of noise
with large variance as the sensitivity of the optimal w∗ is large (to be exact, the
sensitivity is 2). Achieving better performance than local is intuitive because
including the information from multiple sites to estimate a population parame-
ter always results in better performance than using the data from a single site
only. Additionally, we observe that for datasets with lower dimensional samples,
we can use smaller  (i.e., to guarantee lower privacy risk) for the same utility.
In Figure 4(a)–(b), we show the variation of fD(w) with  for the Crime and
the Twitter datasets. We observe similar variation characteristic of fD(w) for
the real datasets as we observed for the synthetic datasets. Note that, for real
datasets, we chose larger τs values than synthetic datasets to achieve the similar
utility.
Dependence on Total Sample Size N . Next, we investigate the variation
in performance with the total sample size N . Intuitively, it should be easier
to guarantee smaller privacy risk  and higher utility, when N is large. Figure
3(c)–(d) show how fD(w) decreases as a function of N on synthetic data. The
variation with N reinforces the results seen earlier with variation of . For a
fixed  and S, the fD(w) decreases as we increase N . For sufficiently large N
and , fD(w) will reach that of the non-private pooled case (Non− priv.). We
observe a sharper decrease in fD(w) for lower-dimensional datasets. In Figure
4(c)–(d), we show the variation of fD(w) with N for the Crime and the Twitter
datasets. Again, we observe similar variation of fD(w) for the real datasets as
we observed for the synthetic datasets.
Dependence on Privacy Parameter δ. Note that, the proposed capeFM
algorithm guarantees (, δ) differential privacy where (, δ) satisfy the relation
δ = 2 σz−µz φ
(
−µz
σz
)
. Recall that δ can be considered as the probability that
the algorithm releases the private information without guaranteeing privacy.
Therefore, we want this to be as small as possible. However, smaller δ also
dictates larger noise variance. We explore the variation of performance with
different δ with a fixed number of colluding sites SC =
⌈
S
3
⌉ − 1. In Figure
3(e)–(f), we show how fD(w) varies with varying δ on synthetic data. We
observe that if N and δ are too small, the proposed capeFM, conv and local
algorithms perform poorly. However, our capeFM algorithm can achieve very
good utility for moderate N and δ values, easily outperforming the other DP
algorithms. We observe in Figure 4(e)–(f) similar characteristic for the two
real datasets, although the variation of fD(w) is not as pronounced as for the
synthetic datasets. Recall that the dp− fm and the objPert algorithms offer
pure -DP guarantee and, therefore, do not vary with δ.
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6 Conclusions
This paper proposes a novel protocol, CAPE, for distributed differentially pri-
vate computations. CAPE is best suited for applications in which private data
must be held locally, e.g. in health care research with legal and ethical limita-
tions on the degree of sharing the “raw” data. CAPE can greatly improve the
privacy-utility tradeoff when (a) all parties follow the protocol and (b) the num-
ber of colluding sites is not more than dS/3e − 1. Our proposed CAPE protocol
is based on an estimation-theoretic analysis of the noise addition process for dif-
ferential privacy and therefore, provides different guarantees than cryptographic
approaches such as SMC. In addition to CAPE, we proposed a new algorithm
for differentially private computation of functions in distributed settings. Our
capeFM algorithm can be employed to compute any continuous and differen-
tiable function. As mentioned before, approximation of the empirical average
cost is required in many distributed optimization problems. We proposed an
improved functional mechanism with a new way to compute the associated sen-
sitivities. We analytically showed that the proposed approach for computing the
sensitivities offers much less additive noise for two common regression problems
– linear regression and logistic regression. Our proposed capeFM can approxi-
mate the privacy-preserving empirical average cost such that we can achieve the
same utility level as the pooled data scenario in certain regimes. We achieve this
by employing the CAPE protocol. We empirically compared the performance of
the proposed algorithms with those of existing and conventional algorithms for
a neural-network based classification problem and a distributed linear regres-
sion problem. We varied privacy parameters and relevant dataset (synthetic and
real) parameters and showed that the proposed algorithms outperformed the ex-
isting and conventional algorithms comfortably – matching the performance of
the non-private algorithm for some parameter choices. In general, the proposed
algorithms offered very good utility indicating that meaningful privacy can be
attained without losing much performance by the virtue of algorithm design.
A very interesting future work could be to extend the CAPE framework to fit
the optimal Staircase Mechanism [62] for differential privacy. Another possi-
ble direction is to extend CAPE to be employable in arbitrary tree-structured
networks.
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Table 1: Comparison of communication overhead
Algorithm Site Aggregator
CAPE O(S +D) O(S2 + SD)
Heikkila¨ et al. [40] Θ(DM) Θ(SDM)
Bonawitz et al. [39] O(S +D) O(S2 + SD)
Appendix
A Communication Overhead
The conventional D-dimensional averaging needs only one message from each
site, thus SD or Θ(SD) is the communication complexity. Our CAPE scheme
employs the SecureAgg protocol to compute the zero-sum noise. The SecureAgg
protocol [39] entails an O(S + D) overhead for each site and O(S2 + SD) for
the server/aggregator. The rest of our scheme requires Θ(D) and Θ(SD) com-
munication overheads for the sites and the aggregator, respectively. On the
other hand, the scheme proposed in [40] has a communication cost propor-
tional to (S + 1)DM or Θ(SDM), where M is the number of compute nodes.
Goryczka et al. [32] compared several secret sharing, homomorphic encryption
and perturbation-based secure sum aggregation and showed their communica-
tion complexities. Except for the secret sharing approach (which requires O(S2)
overhead), the other approaches are O(S) in communication complexity. A com-
parison of communication overhead for different algorithms are shown in Table
1.
B Empirical Comparison of δ and δconv
Recall that the CAPE protocol guarantees (, δ)-DP with δ = 2 σz−µz φ
(
−µz
σz
)
.
We claim that this δ guarantee is much better than the δ guarantee in the
conventional distributed DP scheme. As δ is an implicit function of S, SC
and τ2s , we experimentally compare δ with δconv, where δconv is the smallest δ
guarantee we can afford in the conventional distributed DP scheme to achieve
the same noise variance as the pooled-data scenario for a given . We plot δ and
δconv against different τs values for SC =
⌈
S
3
⌉− 1 and different combinations of
 and S in Figure 5. We observe from the figure that δ is always smaller than
δconv. That is, for achieving the same noise level at the aggregator output (and
therefore the same utility) as the pooled data scenario, we are ensuring a much
better privacy guarantee by employing the CAPE scheme over the conventional
approach.
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C Effect of Fewer Colluding Sites
As mentioned in Section 3.3, we are interested in how the δ and δconv vary with
weaker collusion assumption (i.e., fewer colluding sites). To that end, we vary
the fraction SCS and plot the resulting δ and δconv for different combinations
of , S and τs in Figure 6. Again, we observe that δ is always smaller than
δconv. That is, we are ensuring a much better privacy guarantee by employing
the CAPE scheme over the conventional approach for achieving the same noise
level at the aggregator output (and therefore the same utility) as the pooled
data scenario.
D Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We prove the lemma according to [44]. Recall that in the pooled data
scenario, the sensitivity of the function f(x) is 1N , where x = [x1, . . . ,xS ].
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Therefore, to approximate f(x) satisfying (, δ) differential privacy, we need to
have additive Gaussian noise standard deviation at least τpool =
1
N
√
2 log 1.25δ .
Next, consider the distributed data setting (as in Section 2) with local noise
standard deviation given by
τs =
1
Ns
√
2 log
1.25
δ
=
S
N
√
2 log
1.25
δ
= τ
We observe τpool =
τs
S =⇒ τ2pool = τ
2
S2 . We will now show that the CAPE
algorithm will yield the same noise variance of the estimator at the aggregator.
Recall that at the aggregator we compute acape =
1
S
∑S
s=1 aˆs =
1
N
∑N
n=1 xn +
1
S
∑S
s=1 gs. The variance of the estimator acape is:
τ2cape , S ·
τ2g
S2
=
τ2g
S
=
τ2
S2
,
which is exactly the same as the pooled data scenario. Therefore, the CAPE
algorithm allows us to achieve the same additive noise variance as the pooled
data scenario, while satisfying (, δ) differential privacy at the sites and for
the final output from the aggregator, where (, δ) satisfy the relation δ =
2 σz−µz φ
(
−µz
σz
)
.
E Performance Gain of CAPE
Proof of Proposition 1. The local noise variances are {τ2s } for s ∈ [S]. In the
conventional distributed DP scheme, we compute the following at the aggrega-
tor:
aconv =
1
S
S∑
s=1
as +
1
S
S∑
s=1
es.
The variance of the estimator is:
τ2conv =
s∑
s=1
τ2s
S2
=
1
S2
s∑
s=1
τ2s .
In the CAPE scheme, we compute the following quantity at the aggregator:
acape =
1
S
S∑
s=1
as +
1
S
S∑
s=1
es +
1
S
S∑
s=1
gs.
The variance of the estimator is:
τ2cape =
s∑
s=1
τ2g
S2
=
1
S3
s∑
s=1
τ2s .
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Therefore, the gain of the CAPE scheme over conventional distributed DP ap-
proach is
G =
τ2conv
τ2cape
= S,
which completes the proof.
F Proof of Proposition 2
We start with reviewing some definitions and lemmas [52, Proposition C.2]
necessary for the proof.
Definition 4 (Majorization). Consider two vectors a ∈ RS and b ∈ RS with
non-increasing entries (i.e., ai ≥ aj and bi ≥ bj for i < j). Then a is majorized
by b, denoted a ≺ b, if and only if the following holds:
S∑
s=1
as =
S∑
s=1
bs and
J∑
s=1
as ≤
J∑
s=1
bs ∀J ∈ [S].
Consider nsym , NS [1, . . . , 1] ∈ RS for some positive N . Then any vector n =
[N1, . . . , NS ] ∈ RS with non-increasing entries and
∑S
s=1 |Ns| = N majorizes
nsym, or nsym ≺ n.
Definition 5 (Schur-convex functions). The function K : RS 7→ R is Schur-
convex if for all a ≺ b ∈ RS we have K(a) ≤ K(b).
Lemma 2. If K is symmetric and convex, then K is Schur-convex. The con-
verse does not hold.
G Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2 follows from the fact that the function fˆD(w)
depends on the data samples only through {Λˆj}. The computation of {Λˆj}
is (, δ)-differentially private by the Gaussian mechanism [1, 45], so the release
of fˆD(w) satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy. One way to rationalize this is to
consider that the probability of the event of selecting a particular set of {Λˆj}
is the same as the event of formulating a function fˆD(w) with that set of {Λˆj}.
Therefore, it suffices to consider the joint density of the {Λˆj} and find an upper
bound on the ratio of the joint densities of the {Λˆj} under D and D′. As we
employ the Gaussian mechanism to compute {Λˆj}, the ratio is upper bounded
by exp() with probability at least 1−δ. Therefore, the release of fˆD(w) satisfies
(, δ)-differential privacy. Furthermore, differential privacy is closed under post
processing. Therefore, the computation of the minimizer wˆ∗ = arg minw fˆD(w)
also satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy.
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Figure 7: Variation of errw for synthetic datasets. Top-row: with . Mid-row:
with total samples N . Bottom-row: with δ. Fixed parameter: S = 5.
H Improved Functional Mechanism for Logistic
Regression
In this section, we demonstrate the proposed improved functional mechanism
for a logistic regression problem in the centralized setting. As in Section 4.3,
we show that Algorithm 3 achieves much better utility at the price of a weaker
privacy guarantee ((, δ)-DP vs -DP). The main reason for this performance
improvement is due to defining the sensitivities of Λj separately for each j,
instead of using an uniform conservative upper-bound ∆dp−fm (as in [28]).
We have a dataset D with N samples. Each sample is a tuple (xn, yn),
where xn ∈ RD is the feature vector and yn ∈ {0, 1} is the label. Without loss
of generality, we assume that ‖xn‖2 ≤ 1. We want to find a vector w ∈ RD
such that I(x>nw ≥ 0) gives the label yn for all n ∈ [N ], where I(·) denotes the
indicator function. The cost function due to each sample and a particular w is
f : RD × RD 7→ R and is defined as the logistic loss:
f(xn,w) = log
(
1 + exp
(
x>nw
))− ynx>nw. (15)
The empirical average cost function is defined as
fD(w) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
log
(
1 + exp
(
x>nw
))− ynx>nw. (16)
It is not readily apparent how to express this logistic loss function in the form
of (7). Zhang et al. [28] derived an approximate polynomial form of fD(w),
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denoted by f˜D(w), using a Taylor series expansion. Each function f(xn,w) can
be represented as
f(xn,w) =
M∑
m=1
fm (gm (xn,w))
for some functions fm(·) and gm(·), where each gm(·) is a monomial of {wd}.
Using the Taylor expansion of fm(·) around any real zm, we have
f(xn,w) =
M∑
m=1
∞∑
j=0
f
(j)
m (zm)
j!
(gm (xn,w)− zm)j ,
where f
(j)
m (·) is the j-th derivative of fm(·). Now, for the logistic loss given in
(15), we have [28] that
g1(xn,w) = x
>
nw
f1(z) = log(1 + exp(z))
g2(xn,w) = ynx
>
nw
f2(z) = −z.
Therefore, the empirical average cost can be written as
fD(w) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
2∑
m=1
∞∑
j=0
f
(j)
m (zm)
j!
(gm (xn,w)− zm)j .
Zhang et al. [28] approximated this infinite sum for j = 0, 1, 2 and showed
analysis for the excess error of the approximation. For J = 2, the approximation
error is a small constant. Now, for m = 1, 2 and j = 0, 1, 2, the approximate
empirical average cost function can be written as
f˜D(w) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
2∑
m=1
2∑
j=0
f
(j)
m (zm)
j!
(gm (xn,w)− zm)j .
Using the expressions of f
(j)
m and some simple algebra, it can be shown that
f˜D(w) = log 2 +
D∑
d=1
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
(
1
2
− yn
)
xnd
)
wd
+
D∑
d1=1
D∑
d2=1
(
1
8N
N∑
n=1
xnd1xnd2
)
wd1wd2 ,
where xpq is the q-th element of the p-th sample vector. Using our definitions
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of Λj as before, we have
Λ0 = log 2
Λ1 =
1
N

∑N
n=1
(
1
2 − yn
)
xn1
...∑N
n=1
(
1
2 − yn
)
xnD
 =
(
1>diag
(
1
2 − y
)
X
)>
N
Λ2 =
1
8N

∑N
n=1 x
2
n1 · · ·
∑N
n=1 xn1xnD
...
. . .
...∑N
n=1 xnDxn1 · · ·
∑N
n=1 x
2
nD
 = X>X8N ,
where 1 is an N -dimensional vector of all 1’s and diag
(
1
2 − y
)
is an N × N
diagonal matrix with the elements of 12−y as the diagonal entries. If we express
the {φ¯j} as in the linear regression example (Section 4.3), we can write f˜D(w)
as
f˜D(w) =
2∑
j=0
〈Λj , φ¯j〉. (17)
Now, we focus on finding the sensitivities of {Λj}. Let us consider a neighboring
dataset D′ which contains the same tuples as D, except for the last one, i.e.
(x′N , y
′
N ). We have ∣∣∣ΛD0 − ΛD′0 ∣∣∣ = 0 , ∆0.
Next, we observe∥∥∥ΛD1 − ΛD′1 ∥∥∥
2
=
1
N
∥∥∥∥(12 − yN
)
xN −
(
1
2
− y′N
)
x′N
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 2
N
∥∥∥∥(12 − yN
)
xN
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 2
N
1
2
‖xN‖2 ≤ 1
N
, ∆1,
where we used the inequality
∥∥( 1
2 − yN
)
xN
∥∥
2
≤ 12‖xN‖2 ≤ 12 because, yn ∈{0, 1} and ‖xn‖2 ≤ 1. Finally, we observe∥∥∥ΛD2 − ΛD′2 ∥∥∥
F
=
1
8N
∥∥∥X>X−X′>X′∥∥∥
F
=
1
8N
∥∥∥xNx>N − x′Nx′N>∥∥∥
F
≤
√
2
8N
, ∆2,
where the last inequality follows from realizing that the D×D symmetric matrix
xNx
>
N − x′Nx′N> is at-most rank-2 and
∥∥∥xNx>N − x′Nx′N>∥∥∥
F
≤ √2, as shown
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before (Section 4.3). Now that we have computed the L2-sensitivities of {Λj},
we can compute {Λˆj} and thus, the (, δ)-differentially private approximation
of f˜D(w) following Algorithm 3 (f˜D(w) is the input to Algorithm 3 for logistic
regression). Note that as with linear regression, the sensitivity computation
technique for -differential privacy [28] for each entry of Λj would be ∆
dp−fm =
1
N
(
D2
4 + 3D
)
, which is orders of magnitude larger than ∆j for any D > 1 and
for all j ∈ {0, . . . , J}. Therefore, with the sensitivity computation proposed in
this paper, we can achieve fˆD(w) from f˜D(w) with much less noise. This would
certainly result in a more accurate privacy-preserving estimate of the optimal
wˆ∗ = arg minw fˆD(w). However, one cost of the performance improvement, for
both linear and logistic regression applications, is the weakening of the privacy
guarantee from -differential privacy to (, δ)-differential privacy.
I Distributed Linear Regression – Variation of
errw
Dependence on Privacy Parameter . In the top-row of Figure 7, we show
the variation of errw of different algorithms for different values of  on synthetic
data. For this experiment, we kept the number of total samples N and the
number of sites S fixed. We show the plots for two different feature dimensions:
D = 20 and D = 50, each with two different sample sizes. For both of the
synthetic datasets, we observe that as  increases (higher privacy risk), the errw
decreases. The proposed capeFM reaches very small errw for some parameter
choices and clearly outperforms the dp− fm, objPert, conv and local. One of
the reasons that capeFM outperforms conv is the smaller noise variance at the
aggregator that we can achieve due to the correlated noise scheme. Moreover,
capeFM outperforms dp− fm because dp− fm suffers from a much larger vari-
ance at the aggregator (due to the conservative sensitivity computation of λnφ).
On the other hand, objPert also entails addition of noise with large variance
as the sensitivity of the optimal w∗ is large (to be exact, the sensitivity is 2).
Achieving better performance than local is intuitive because including the infor-
mation from multiple sites to estimate a population parameter always results in
better performance than using the data from a single site only. Additionally, we
observe that for datasets with lower dimensional samples, we can use smaller 
(i.e., to guarantee lower privacy risk) for the same utility.
Dependence on Total Sample Size N . Next, we investigate the variation
in performance with the total sample size N . The middle-row of Figure 7 shows
how errw decreases as a function of total sample size N on synthetic data. The
variation with N reinforces the results seen earlier with variation of . For a
fixed  and S, errw decreases as we increase N . For sufficiently large N and
, errw will reach that of the non-private pooled case (Non− priv.). Again, we
observe a sharper decrease in errw for lower-dimensional datasets. Note that,
for the synthetic datasets, the error errw for objPert is too large to show on the
same scale as other algorithms. That is why the errw curves for objPert do not
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appear in Figure 7 (middle-row).
Dependence on Privacy Parameter δ. In the bottom-row of Figure 7,
we show how errw varies with varying δ on synthetic data. We observe that
if N and δ are too small, the proposed capeFM, conv and local algorithms
perform poorly. However, the proposed capeFM algorithm can achieve very good
utility for moderateN and δ values, easily outperforming the other differentially-
private algorithms. Recall that the dp− fm and the objPert algorithms offer pure
-differential privacy and, therefore, do not vary with δ. Again we observe that,
for the synthetic datasets, the error errw for objPert is too large and do not
appear in Figure 7 (bottom row).
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